!50 fix CVE-2025-0838

From: @xinghe_1 
Reviewed-by: @yanan-rock 
Signed-off-by: @yanan-rock

abseil-cpp.spec

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 Name:           abseil-cpp
 Version:        20220623.1
-Release:        5
+Release:        6
 Summary:        C++ Common Libraries
 
 License:        ASL 2.0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Source0:        https://github.com/abseil/abseil-cpp/archive/%{version}/%{name}-
 Patch0:         backport-Do-not-leak-maes-msse4.1-into-pkgconfig.patch
 Patch1:         abseil-cpp-20210324.2-sw.patch
 Patch2:         backport-Add-missing-include-for-std-unique_ptr.patch
+Patch3:         backport-CVE-2025-0838.patch
 
 %ifarch loongarch64
 Patch100:	0001-add-loongarch-suopport-for-abseil-cpp.patch
@@ -69,6 +70,12 @@ Development headers for %{name}
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/*.pc
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Feb 24 2025 xinghe <xinghe2@h-partners.com> - 20220623.1-6
+- Type:cves
+- CVE:CVE-2025-0838
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2025-0838
+
 * Tue Apr 16 2024 xinghe <xinghe2@h-partners.com> - 20220623.1-5
 - Type:bugfix
 - CVE:NA

backport-CVE-2025-0838.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From 3c4b18dc14949d1c6dac8bae2e459c71b21e3416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Derek Mauro <dmauro@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 15:58:56 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix potential integer overflow in hash container
+ create/resize
+
+The sized constructors, reserve(), and rehash() methods of
+absl::{flat,node}_hash_{set,map} did not impose an upper bound on
+their size argument. As a result, it was possible for a caller to pass
+a very large size that would cause an integer overflow when computing
+the size of the container's backing store. Subsequent accesses to the
+container might then access out-of-bounds memory.
+
+The fix is in two parts:
+
+1) Update max_size() to return the maximum number of items that can be
+stored in the container
+
+2) Validate the size arguments to the constructors, reserve(), and
+rehash() methods, and abort the program when the argument is invalid
+
+We've looked at uses of these containers in Google codebases like
+Chrome, and determined this vulnerability is likely to be difficult to
+exploit. This is primarily because container sizes are rarely
+attacker-controlled.
+
+The bug was discovered by Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>.
+
+Conflict: remove absl/base/config.h and context adapt
+Reference: https://github.com/abseil/abseil-cpp/commit/3c4b18dc14949d1c6dac8bae2e459c71b21e3416
+---
+ absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set.h       | 15 ++++++++++++++-
+ absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set_test.cc |  8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set.h b/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set.h
+index ea912f8..40c2c67 100644
+--- a/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set.h
++++ b/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set.h
+@@ -745,6 +745,12 @@ inline size_t NormalizeCapacity(size_t n) {
+   return n ? ~size_t{} >> countl_zero(n) : 1;
+ }
+ 
++template <size_t kSlotSize>
++size_t MaxValidCapacity() {
++  return NormalizeCapacity((std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max)() / 4 /
++                           kSlotSize);
++}
++
+ // General notes on capacity/growth methods below:
+ // - We use 7/8th as maximum load factor. For 16-wide groups, that gives an
+ //   average of two empty slots per group.
+@@ -1148,6 +1154,8 @@ class raw_hash_set {
+       : ctrl_(EmptyGroup()),
+         settings_(0, HashtablezInfoHandle(), hash, eq, alloc) {
+     if (bucket_count) {
++      ABSL_RAW_CHECK(bucket_count <= MaxValidCapacity<sizeof(slot_type)>(),
++		     "Hash table size overflow");
+       capacity_ = NormalizeCapacity(bucket_count);
+       initialize_slots();
+     }
+@@ -1341,7 +1349,9 @@ class raw_hash_set {
+   bool empty() const { return !size(); }
+   size_t size() const { return size_; }
+   size_t capacity() const { return capacity_; }
+-  size_t max_size() const { return (std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max)(); }
++  size_t max_size() const {
++    return CapacityToGrowth(MaxValidCapacity<sizeof(slot_type)>());
++  }
+ 
+   ABSL_ATTRIBUTE_REINITIALIZES void clear() {
+     // Iterating over this container is O(bucket_count()). When bucket_count()
+@@ -1678,6 +1688,8 @@ class raw_hash_set {
+     auto m = NormalizeCapacity(n | GrowthToLowerboundCapacity(size()));
+     // n == 0 unconditionally rehashes as per the standard.
+     if (n == 0 || m > capacity_) {
++      ABSL_RAW_CHECK(m <= MaxValidCapacity<sizeof(slot_type)>(),
++		     "Hash table size overflow");
+       resize(m);
+ 
+       // This is after resize, to ensure that we have completed the allocation
+@@ -1688,6 +1700,7 @@ class raw_hash_set {
+ 
+   void reserve(size_t n) {
+     if (n > size() + growth_left()) {
++      ABSL_RAW_CHECK(n <= max_size(), "Hash table size overflow");
+       size_t m = GrowthToLowerboundCapacity(n);
+       resize(NormalizeCapacity(m));
+ 
+diff --git a/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set_test.cc b/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set_test.cc
+index f77ffbc..078bbad 100644
+--- a/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set_test.cc
++++ b/absl/container/internal/raw_hash_set_test.cc
+@@ -2181,6 +2181,14 @@ TEST(Table, AlignOne) {
+   }
+ }
+ 
++TEST(Table, MaxSizeOverflow) {
++  size_t overflow = (std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max)();
++  EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(IntTable t(overflow), "Hash table size overflow");
++  IntTable t;
++  EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(t.reserve(overflow), "Hash table size overflow");
++  EXPECT_DEATH_IF_SUPPORTED(t.rehash(overflow), "Hash table size overflow");
++}
++
+ }  // namespace
+ }  // namespace container_internal
+ ABSL_NAMESPACE_END
+-- 
+2.43.0