backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From 0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 09:14:00 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
-
-Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
-Conflict:NA
-
----
- Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst           |  6 ++++++
- Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
- Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-index 9c58019..a62255b 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
- .. currentmodule:: jinja2
- 
-+-   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
-+    greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
-+    Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
-+    as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated first.
-+    GHSA-h75v-3vvj-5mfj
-+
- Version 3.0.3
- -------------
- 
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
-index 002e129..f3d4fca 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
-@@ -270,7 +270,9 @@ def do_lower(s: str) -> str:
-     """Convert a value to lowercase."""
-     return soft_str(s).lower()
- 
--_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
-+# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
-+# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
-+_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.ASCII)
- 
- @pass_eval_context
- def do_xmlattr(
-@@ -279,8 +281,14 @@ def do_xmlattr(
-     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
-     All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
-     escaped:
--    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
--    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
-+    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
-+    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
-+
-+    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
-+    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
-+    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
-+    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
-+    first.
-     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
- 
-         <ul{{ {'class': 'my_list', 'missing': none,
-@@ -299,6 +307,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(
-     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
-     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
- 
-+    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
-+        Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
-+        are not allowed.
-+
-     .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
-         Keys with spaces are not allowed.
-     """
-@@ -308,8 +320,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(
-         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
-             continue
- 
--        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
--            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
-+        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
-+            raise ValueError(f"Invalid character in attribute name: {key!r}")
- 
-         items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
- 
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py
-index 45843fd..6533370 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py
-@@ -463,11 +463,12 @@ class TestFilter:
-         assert 'bar="23"' in out
-         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
- 
--    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
--        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
--            env.from_string(
--                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
--            ).render()
-+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
-+    def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env: Environment, sep: str) -> None:
-+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
-+            env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
-+                key=f"class{sep}onclick=alert(1)"
-+            )
- 
-     def test_sort1(self, env):
-         tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 336315f75ea1a788b3254bab5fb75f3aec558b67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: JackWei <weihaohao2@huawei.com>
-Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2024 14:49:28 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56201
-
----
- Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
- Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py |  7 ++++++-
- Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-index a62255b..55d8a96 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
- .. currentmodule:: jinja2
- 
-+-   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
-+    issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
-+    :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
- -   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
-     greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
-     Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
-index 52fd5b8..0314f67 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
-@@ -1122,9 +1122,14 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
-             )
-             self.writeline(f"if {frame.symbols.ref(alias)} is missing:")
-             self.indent()
-+            # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
-+            # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
-+            # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
-+            # executed as part of the f-string.
-+            position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
-             message = (
-                 "the template {included_template.__name__!r}"
--                f" (imported on {self.position(node)})"
-+                f" (imported on {position})"
-                 f" does not export the requested name {name!r}"
-             )
-             self.writeline(
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py
-index 42a773f..b33a877 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py
-@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
- import os
- import re
- 
-+import pytest
-+
-+from jinja2 import UndefinedError
- from jinja2.environment import Environment
- from jinja2.loaders import DictLoader
- 
-@@ -26,3 +29,19 @@ def test_import_as_with_context_deterministic(tmp_path):
-     expect = [f"'bar{i}': " for i in range(10)]
-     found = re.findall(r"'bar\d': ", content)[:10]
-     assert found == expect
-+
-+
-+def test_undefined_import_curly_name():
-+    env = Environment(
-+        loader=DictLoader(
-+            {
-+                "{bad}": "{% from 'macro' import m %}{{ m() }}",
-+                "macro": "",
-+             }
-+        )
-+    )
-+
-+    # Must not raise `NameError: 'bad' is not defined`, as that would indicate
-+    # that `{bad}` is being interpreted as an f-string. It must be escaped.
-+    with pytest.raises(UndefinedError):
-+        env.get_template("{bad}").render()
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
----
- Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 81 +++++++++++++++--------------
- Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py | 18 +++++++
- 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-index 4294884..2b328fe 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import typing as t
- from _string import formatter_field_name_split  # type: ignore
- from collections import abc
- from collections import deque
-+from functools import update_wrapper
- from string import Formatter
- 
- from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
-@@ -79,21 +80,6 @@ _mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type, t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
-     ),
- )
- 
--
--def inspect_format_method(callable: t.Callable) -> t.Optional[str]:
--    if not isinstance(
--        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
--    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
--        return None
--
--    obj = callable.__self__
--
--    if isinstance(obj, str):
--        return obj
--
--    return None
--
--
- def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
-     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
-     MAX_RANGE items.
-@@ -313,6 +299,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-                     except AttributeError:
-                         pass
-                     else:
-+                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
-+                        if fmt is not None:
-+                            return fmt
-                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
-                             return value
-                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
-@@ -330,6 +319,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-             except (TypeError, LookupError):
-                 pass
-         else:
-+            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
-+            if fmt is not None:
-+                return fmt
-             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
-                 return value
-             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
-@@ -345,34 +337,48 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-             exc=SecurityError,
-         )
- 
--    def format_string(
--        self,
--        s: str,
--        args: t.Tuple[t.Any, ...],
--        kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],
--        format_func: t.Optional[t.Callable] = None,
--    ) -> str:
--        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
--        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
-+    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
-+        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
-+        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
-+        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
-+        also sandboxed.
-         """
-+        if not isinstance(
-+            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
-+        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
-+            return None
-+
-+        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
-+
-+        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
-+            return None
-+
-+        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
-+        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
-         formatter: SandboxedFormatter
--        if isinstance(s, Markup):
--            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=s.escape)
-+
-+        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
-+            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
-         else:
-             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
- 
--        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
--            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
--                raise TypeError(
--                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument"
--                    f" {len(args) + (kwargs is not None)} given"
--                )
-+        vformat = formatter.vformat
-+
-+        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
-+            if is_format_map:
-+                if kwargs:
-+                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
-+
-+                if len(args) != 1:
-+                    raise TypeError(
-+                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
-+                    )
- 
--            kwargs = args[0]
--            args = ()
-+                kwargs = args[0]
-+                args = ()
-+            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
- 
--        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
--        return type(s)(rv)
-+        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
- 
-     def call(
-         __self,  # noqa: B902
-@@ -382,9 +388,6 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-         **kwargs: t.Any,
-     ) -> t.Any:
-         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
--        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
--        if fmt is not None:
--            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
- 
-         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
-         # errors when proxying the call.
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
-index 0e8dc5c..9c8bad6 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
-@@ -171,3 +171,21 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
-             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
-         )
-         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
-+
-+
-+    def test_indirect_call(self):
-+        def run(value, arg):
-+            return value.run(arg)
-+
-+        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
-+        env.filters["run"] = run
-+        t = env.from_string(
-+            """{% set
-+                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
-+            %}
-+            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
-+            """
-+        )
-+
-+        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
-+            t.render()
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-CVE-2025-27516.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From 065334d1ee5b7210e1a0a93c37238c86858f2af7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 10:08:48 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] attr filter uses env.getattr
----
- Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
- Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py  | 38 ++++++++++++-----------------
- Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py | 11 +++++++++
- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-index 55d8a96..9170467 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
-@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
- .. currentmodule:: jinja2
- 
-+-   The ``|attr`` filter does not bypass the environment's attribute lookup,
-+    allowing the sandbox to apply its checks. :ghsa:`cpwx-vrp4-4pq7`
-+
- -   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
-     issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
-     :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
-index f3d4fca..0449901 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
-@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import typing
- import typing as t
- import warnings
- from collections import abc
-+from inspect import getattr_static
- from itertools import chain
- from itertools import groupby
- 
-@@ -1382,32 +1383,25 @@ def do_reverse(value: t.Union[str, t.Iterable[V]]) -> t.Union[str, t.Iterable[V]
- def do_attr(
-     environment: "Environment", obj: t.Any, name: str
- ) -> t.Union[Undefined, t.Any]:
--    """Get an attribute of an object.  ``foo|attr("bar")`` works like
--    ``foo.bar`` just that always an attribute is returned and items are not
--    looked up.
-+    """Get an attribute of an object. ``foo|attr("bar")`` works like
-+    ``foo.bar``, but returns undefined instead of falling back to ``foo["bar"]``
-+    if the attribute doesn't exist.
- 
-     See :ref:`Notes on subscriptions <notes-on-subscriptions>` for more details.
-     """
-+    # Environment.getattr will fall back to obj[name] if obj.name doesn't exist.
-+    # But we want to call env.getattr to get behavior such as sandboxing.
-+    # Determine if the attr exists first, so we know the fallback won't trigger.
-     try:
--        name = str(name)
--    except UnicodeError:
--        pass
--    else:
--        try:
--            value = getattr(obj, name)
--        except AttributeError:
--            pass
--        else:
--            if environment.sandboxed:
--                environment = t.cast("SandboxedEnvironment", environment)
--
--                if not environment.is_safe_attribute(obj, name, value):
--                    return environment.unsafe_undefined(obj, name)
--
--            return value
--
--    return environment.undefined(obj=obj, name=name)
--
-+        # This avoids executing properties/descriptors, but misses __getattr__
-+        # and __getattribute__ dynamic attrs.
-+        getattr_static(obj, name)
-+    except AttributeError:
-+        # This finds dynamic attrs, and we know it's not a descriptor at this point.
-+        if not hasattr(obj, name):
-+            return environment.undefined(obj=obj, name=name)
-+
-+    return environment.getattr(obj, name)
- 
- @typing.overload
- def sync_do_map(
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
-index 9c8bad6..323c6b5 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
-@@ -189,3 +189,14 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
- 
-         with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
-             t.render()
-+
-+
-+    def test_attr_filter(self) -> None:
-+        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
-+        t = env.from_string(
-+            """{{ "{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}"
-+                  | attr("format")(not_here) }}"""
-+        )
-+
-+        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
-+            t.render()
--- 
-2.46.0
-

python-jinja2.spec

@@ -2,17 +2,13 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        3.0.3
-Release:        7
+Release:        3
 Summary:        A full-featured template engine for Python
 License:        BSD
 URL:            http://jinja.pocoo.org/
 Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%{version}.tar.gz
 
 Patch6000:      backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch
-Patch6001:      backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch
-Patch6002:      backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
-Patch6003:      backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch
-Patch6004:      backport-CVE-2025-27516.patch
 
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
@@ -68,31 +64,7 @@ popd
 %doc Jinja2-%{version}/examples
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Mar 10 2025 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.0.3-7
+* Mon Jan 22 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2.huawei.com> - 3.0.3-3
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2025-27516
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:fix CVE-2025-27516
-
-* Thu Dec 26 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.0.3-6
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2024-56201
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:fix CVE-2024-56201
-
-* Wed Dec 25 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.0.3-5
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2024-56326
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:fix CVE-2024-56326
-
-* Fri May 10 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.0.3-4
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2024-34064
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:fix CVE-2024-34064
-
-* Mon Jan 22 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.0.3-3
 - Type:CVE
 - CVE:CVE-2024-22195
 - SUG:NA