!95 [sync] PR-90: fix CVE-2025-27516

From: @openeuler-sync-bot 
Reviewed-by: @yangyuan32 
Signed-off-by: @yangyuan32

backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 09:14:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
+
+Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
+Conflict:NA
+
+---
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst           |  6 ++++++
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
+index 9c58019..a62255b 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
++    greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
++    Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
++    as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated first.
++    GHSA-h75v-3vvj-5mfj
++
+ Version 3.0.3
+ -------------
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+index 002e129..f3d4fca 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -270,7 +270,9 @@ def do_lower(s: str) -> str:
+     """Convert a value to lowercase."""
+     return soft_str(s).lower()
+ 
+-_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
++# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
++_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.ASCII)
+ 
+ @pass_eval_context
+ def do_xmlattr(
+@@ -279,8 +281,14 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+     All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
+     escaped:
+-    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
+-    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
++    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
++    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
++
++    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
++    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
++    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
++    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
++    first.
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+ 
+         <ul{{ {'class': 'my_list', 'missing': none,
+@@ -299,6 +307,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
+     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+ 
++    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
++        Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
++        are not allowed.
++
+     .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
+         Keys with spaces are not allowed.
+     """
+@@ -308,8 +320,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
+             continue
+ 
+-        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
+-            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError(f"Invalid character in attribute name: {key!r}")
+ 
+         items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py
+index 45843fd..6533370 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_filters.py
+@@ -463,11 +463,12 @@ class TestFilter:
+         assert 'bar="23"' in out
+         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
+ 
+-    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
+-        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
+-            env.from_string(
+-                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
+-            ).render()
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
++    def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env: Environment, sep: str) -> None:
++        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
++            env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
++                key=f"class{sep}onclick=alert(1)"
++            )
+ 
+     def test_sort1(self, env):
+         tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 336315f75ea1a788b3254bab5fb75f3aec558b67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: JackWei <weihaohao2@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2024 14:49:28 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56201
+
+---
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py |  7 ++++++-
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
+index a62255b..55d8a96 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
++    issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
++    :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
+ -   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
+     greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
+     Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+index 52fd5b8..0314f67 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+@@ -1122,9 +1122,14 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
+             )
+             self.writeline(f"if {frame.symbols.ref(alias)} is missing:")
+             self.indent()
++            # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
++            # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
++            # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
++            # executed as part of the f-string.
++            position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
+             message = (
+                 "the template {included_template.__name__!r}"
+-                f" (imported on {self.position(node)})"
++                f" (imported on {position})"
+                 f" does not export the requested name {name!r}"
+             )
+             self.writeline(
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py
+index 42a773f..b33a877 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_compile.py
+@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
+ import os
+ import re
+ 
++import pytest
++
++from jinja2 import UndefinedError
+ from jinja2.environment import Environment
+ from jinja2.loaders import DictLoader
+ 
+@@ -26,3 +29,19 @@ def test_import_as_with_context_deterministic(tmp_path):
+     expect = [f"'bar{i}': " for i in range(10)]
+     found = re.findall(r"'bar\d': ", content)[:10]
+     assert found == expect
++
++
++def test_undefined_import_curly_name():
++    env = Environment(
++        loader=DictLoader(
++            {
++                "{bad}": "{% from 'macro' import m %}{{ m() }}",
++                "macro": "",
++             }
++        )
++    )
++
++    # Must not raise `NameError: 'bad' is not defined`, as that would indicate
++    # that `{bad}` is being interpreted as an f-string. It must be escaped.
++    with pytest.raises(UndefinedError):
++        env.get_template("{bad}").render()
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
+---
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 81 +++++++++++++++--------------
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py | 18 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index 4294884..2b328fe 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import typing as t
+ from _string import formatter_field_name_split  # type: ignore
+ from collections import abc
+ from collections import deque
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from string import Formatter
+ 
+ from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
+@@ -79,21 +80,6 @@ _mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type, t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
+     ),
+ )
+ 
+-
+-def inspect_format_method(callable: t.Callable) -> t.Optional[str]:
+-    if not isinstance(
+-        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+-        return None
+-
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-
+-    if isinstance(obj, str):
+-        return obj
+-
+-    return None
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -313,6 +299,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -330,6 +319,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -345,34 +337,48 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+ 
+-    def format_string(
+-        self,
+-        s: str,
+-        args: t.Tuple[t.Any, ...],
+-        kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],
+-        format_func: t.Optional[t.Callable] = None,
+-    ) -> str:
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++
++        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
++
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++
++        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
+         formatter: SandboxedFormatter
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=s.escape)
++
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+ 
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument"
+-                    f" {len(args) + (kwargs is not None)} given"
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++
++        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
+ 
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = ()
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+     def call(
+         __self,  # noqa: B902
+@@ -382,9 +388,6 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+         **kwargs: t.Any,
+     ) -> t.Any:
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+ 
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
+index 0e8dc5c..9c8bad6 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -171,3 +171,21 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
+             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
+         )
+         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
++
++
++    def test_indirect_call(self):
++        def run(value, arg):
++            return value.run(arg)
++
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        env.filters["run"] = run
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{% set
++                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
++            %}
++            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
++            """
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

backport-CVE-2025-27516.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From 065334d1ee5b7210e1a0a93c37238c86858f2af7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 10:08:48 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] attr filter uses env.getattr
+---
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py  | 38 ++++++++++++-----------------
+ Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py | 11 +++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
+index 55d8a96..9170467 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   The ``|attr`` filter does not bypass the environment's attribute lookup,
++    allowing the sandbox to apply its checks. :ghsa:`cpwx-vrp4-4pq7`
++
+ -   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
+     issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
+     :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+index f3d4fca..0449901 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import typing
+ import typing as t
+ import warnings
+ from collections import abc
++from inspect import getattr_static
+ from itertools import chain
+ from itertools import groupby
+ 
+@@ -1382,32 +1383,25 @@ def do_reverse(value: t.Union[str, t.Iterable[V]]) -> t.Union[str, t.Iterable[V]
+ def do_attr(
+     environment: "Environment", obj: t.Any, name: str
+ ) -> t.Union[Undefined, t.Any]:
+-    """Get an attribute of an object.  ``foo|attr("bar")`` works like
+-    ``foo.bar`` just that always an attribute is returned and items are not
+-    looked up.
++    """Get an attribute of an object. ``foo|attr("bar")`` works like
++    ``foo.bar``, but returns undefined instead of falling back to ``foo["bar"]``
++    if the attribute doesn't exist.
+ 
+     See :ref:`Notes on subscriptions <notes-on-subscriptions>` for more details.
+     """
++    # Environment.getattr will fall back to obj[name] if obj.name doesn't exist.
++    # But we want to call env.getattr to get behavior such as sandboxing.
++    # Determine if the attr exists first, so we know the fallback won't trigger.
+     try:
+-        name = str(name)
+-    except UnicodeError:
+-        pass
+-    else:
+-        try:
+-            value = getattr(obj, name)
+-        except AttributeError:
+-            pass
+-        else:
+-            if environment.sandboxed:
+-                environment = t.cast("SandboxedEnvironment", environment)
+-
+-                if not environment.is_safe_attribute(obj, name, value):
+-                    return environment.unsafe_undefined(obj, name)
+-
+-            return value
+-
+-    return environment.undefined(obj=obj, name=name)
+-
++        # This avoids executing properties/descriptors, but misses __getattr__
++        # and __getattribute__ dynamic attrs.
++        getattr_static(obj, name)
++    except AttributeError:
++        # This finds dynamic attrs, and we know it's not a descriptor at this point.
++        if not hasattr(obj, name):
++            return environment.undefined(obj=obj, name=name)
++
++    return environment.getattr(obj, name)
+ 
+ @typing.overload
+ def sync_do_map(
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
+index 9c8bad6..323c6b5 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.0.3/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -189,3 +189,14 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
+ 
+         with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
+             t.render()
++
++
++    def test_attr_filter(self) -> None:
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{{ "{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}"
++                  | attr("format")(not_here) }}"""
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

python-jinja2.spec

@@ -2,13 +2,17 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        3.0.3
-Release:        3
+Release:        7
 Summary:        A full-featured template engine for Python
 License:        BSD
 URL:            http://jinja.pocoo.org/
 Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%{version}.tar.gz
 
 Patch6000:      backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch
+Patch6001:      backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch
+Patch6002:      backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
+Patch6003:      backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch
+Patch6004:      backport-CVE-2025-27516.patch
 
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
@@ -64,7 +68,31 @@ popd
 %doc Jinja2-%{version}/examples
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Jan 22 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2.huawei.com> - 3.0.3-3
+* Mon Mar 10 2025 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.0.3-7
+- Type:CVE
+- CVE:CVE-2025-27516
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2025-27516
+
+* Thu Dec 26 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.0.3-6
+- Type:CVE
+- CVE:CVE-2024-56201
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2024-56201
+
+* Wed Dec 25 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.0.3-5
+- Type:CVE
+- CVE:CVE-2024-56326
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2024-56326
+
+* Fri May 10 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.0.3-4
+- Type:CVE
+- CVE:CVE-2024-34064
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2024-34064
+
+* Mon Jan 22 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.0.3-3
 - Type:CVE
 - CVE:CVE-2024-22195
 - SUG:NA