QEMU update to version 6.2.0-97:

- nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Close stray clients at server-stop
- main-loop.h: introduce qemu_in_main_thread()
- aio-wait.h: introduce AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED
- nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Drop non-negotiating clients
- nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Cap default max-connections to 100
- nbd/server: Plumb in new args to nbd_client_add()
- nbd: Minor style and typo fixes

Signed-off-by: Jiabo Feng <fengjiabo1@huawei.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5e30f8e310a15452f86723a0ae459d303cc29470)
This commit is contained in:
Jiabo Feng 2024-08-13 16:18:01 +08:00 committed by openeuler-sync-bot
parent 8461babc0a
commit 8a522bdd9f
8 changed files with 885 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
From 0943a32cdfc513c7a845ecd4dabba06fb1ca46a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 05:31:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] aio-wait.h: introduce AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED
Same as AIO_WAIT_WHILE macro, but if we are in the Main loop
do not release and then acquire ctx_ 's aiocontext.
Once all Aiocontext locks go away, this macro will replace
AIO_WAIT_WHILE.
Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
Message-Id: <20220926093214.506243-5-eesposit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
---
include/block/aio-wait.h | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/block/aio-wait.h b/include/block/aio-wait.h
index b39eefb38d..e4b811433d 100644
--- a/include/block/aio-wait.h
+++ b/include/block/aio-wait.h
@@ -59,10 +59,13 @@ typedef struct {
extern AioWait global_aio_wait;
/**
- * AIO_WAIT_WHILE:
+ * AIO_WAIT_WHILE_INTERNAL:
* @ctx: the aio context, or NULL if multiple aio contexts (for which the
* caller does not hold a lock) are involved in the polling condition.
* @cond: wait while this conditional expression is true
+ * @unlock: whether to unlock and then lock again @ctx. This apples
+ * only when waiting for another AioContext from the main loop.
+ * Otherwise it's ignored.
*
* Wait while a condition is true. Use this to implement synchronous
* operations that require event loop activity.
@@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ extern AioWait global_aio_wait;
* wait on conditions between two IOThreads since that could lead to deadlock,
* go via the main loop instead.
*/
-#define AIO_WAIT_WHILE(ctx, cond) ({ \
+#define AIO_WAIT_WHILE_INTERNAL(ctx, cond, unlock) ({ \
bool waited_ = false; \
AioWait *wait_ = &global_aio_wait; \
AioContext *ctx_ = (ctx); \
@@ -90,11 +93,11 @@ extern AioWait global_aio_wait;
assert(qemu_get_current_aio_context() == \
qemu_get_aio_context()); \
while ((cond)) { \
- if (ctx_) { \
+ if (unlock && ctx_) { \
aio_context_release(ctx_); \
} \
aio_poll(qemu_get_aio_context(), true); \
- if (ctx_) { \
+ if (unlock && ctx_) { \
aio_context_acquire(ctx_); \
} \
waited_ = true; \
@@ -103,6 +106,12 @@ extern AioWait global_aio_wait;
qatomic_dec(&wait_->num_waiters); \
waited_; })
+#define AIO_WAIT_WHILE(ctx, cond) \
+ AIO_WAIT_WHILE_INTERNAL(ctx, cond, true)
+
+#define AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED(ctx, cond) \
+ AIO_WAIT_WHILE_INTERNAL(ctx, cond, false)
+
/**
* aio_wait_kick:
* Wake up the main thread if it is waiting on AIO_WAIT_WHILE(). During
--
2.45.1.windows.1

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From f4b69408785a19f4acd0b16cd3b97aa93da48d47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 10:15:46 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] main-loop.h: introduce qemu_in_main_thread()
When invoked from the main loop, this function is the same
as qemu_mutex_iothread_locked, and returns true if the BQL is held.
When invoked from iothreads or tests, it returns true only
if the current AioContext is the Main Loop.
This essentially just extends qemu_mutex_iothread_locked to work
also in unit tests or other users like storage-daemon, that run
in the Main Loop but end up using the implementation in
stubs/iothread-lock.c.
Using qemu_mutex_iothread_locked in unit tests defaults to false
because they use the implementation in stubs/iothread-lock,
making all assertions added in next patches fail despite the
AioContext is still the main loop.
See the comment in the function header for more information.
Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220303151616.325444-2-eesposit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
---
include/qemu/main-loop.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
softmmu/cpus.c | 5 +++++
stubs/iothread-lock-block.c | 8 ++++++++
stubs/meson.build | 3 +++
4 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 stubs/iothread-lock-block.c
diff --git a/include/qemu/main-loop.h b/include/qemu/main-loop.h
index 85dd5ada9e..a472ebd289 100644
--- a/include/qemu/main-loop.h
+++ b/include/qemu/main-loop.h
@@ -242,9 +242,33 @@ AioContext *iohandler_get_aio_context(void);
* must always be taken outside other locks. This function helps
* functions take different paths depending on whether the current
* thread is running within the main loop mutex.
+ *
+ * This function should never be used in the block layer, because
+ * unit tests, block layer tools and qemu-storage-daemon do not
+ * have a BQL.
+ * Please instead refer to qemu_in_main_thread().
*/
bool qemu_mutex_iothread_locked(void);
+/**
+ * qemu_in_main_thread: return whether it's possible to safely access
+ * the global state of the block layer.
+ *
+ * Global state of the block layer is not accessible from I/O threads
+ * or worker threads; only from threads that "own" the default
+ * AioContext that qemu_get_aio_context() returns. For tests, block
+ * layer tools and qemu-storage-daemon there is a designated thread that
+ * runs the event loop for qemu_get_aio_context(), and that is the
+ * main thread.
+ *
+ * For emulators, however, any thread that holds the BQL can act
+ * as the block layer main thread; this will be any of the actual
+ * main thread, the vCPU threads or the RCU thread.
+ *
+ * For clarity, do not use this function outside the block layer.
+ */
+bool qemu_in_main_thread(void);
+
/**
* qemu_mutex_lock_iothread: Lock the main loop mutex.
*
diff --git a/softmmu/cpus.c b/softmmu/cpus.c
index 071085f840..3f61a3c31d 100644
--- a/softmmu/cpus.c
+++ b/softmmu/cpus.c
@@ -481,6 +481,11 @@ bool qemu_mutex_iothread_locked(void)
return iothread_locked;
}
+bool qemu_in_main_thread(void)
+{
+ return qemu_mutex_iothread_locked();
+}
+
/*
* The BQL is taken from so many places that it is worth profiling the
* callers directly, instead of funneling them all through a single function.
diff --git a/stubs/iothread-lock-block.c b/stubs/iothread-lock-block.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c88ed70462
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stubs/iothread-lock-block.c
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu/main-loop.h"
+
+bool qemu_in_main_thread(void)
+{
+ return qemu_get_current_aio_context() == qemu_get_aio_context();
+}
+
diff --git a/stubs/meson.build b/stubs/meson.build
index 71469c1d50..3aca1d67c1 100644
--- a/stubs/meson.build
+++ b/stubs/meson.build
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ if linux_io_uring.found()
stub_ss.add(files('io_uring.c'))
endif
stub_ss.add(files('iothread-lock.c'))
+if have_block
+ stub_ss.add(files('iothread-lock-block.c'))
+endif
stub_ss.add(files('isa-bus.c'))
stub_ss.add(files('is-daemonized.c'))
if libaio.found()
--
2.45.1.windows.1

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From 1953dfe58fae8c778b275d786a4166add940353d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 16:49:20 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] nbd: Minor style and typo fixes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Touch up a comment with the wrong type name, and an over-long line,
both noticed while working on upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-10-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
nbd/server.c | 2 +-
qemu-nbd.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index 37515ed520..73fd4c46d1 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ static void nbd_export_request_shutdown(BlockExport *blk_exp)
blk_exp_ref(&exp->common);
/*
- * TODO: Should we expand QMP NbdServerRemoveNode enum to allow a
+ * TODO: Should we expand QMP BlockExportRemoveMode enum to allow a
* close mode that stops advertising the export to new clients but
* still permits existing clients to run to completion? Because of
* that possibility, nbd_export_close() can be called more than
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index 15a4bc4018..86dfa0b5d9 100644
--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
pthread_t client_thread;
const char *fmt = NULL;
Error *local_err = NULL;
- BlockdevDetectZeroesOptions detect_zeroes = BLOCKDEV_DETECT_ZEROES_OPTIONS_OFF;
+ BlockdevDetectZeroesOptions detect_zeroes =
+ BLOCKDEV_DETECT_ZEROES_OPTIONS_OFF;
QDict *options = NULL;
const char *export_name = NULL; /* defaults to "" later for server mode */
const char *export_description = NULL;
--
2.45.1.windows.1

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@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
From ed53c5fb670478378c72f2d4312160eccf34a6dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2024 13:53:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Cap default max-connections to
100
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Allowing an unlimited number of clients to any web service is a recipe
for a rudimentary denial of service attack: the client merely needs to
open lots of sockets without closing them, until qemu no longer has
any more fds available to allocate.
For qemu-nbd, we default to allowing only 1 connection unless more are
explicitly asked for (-e or --shared); this was historically picked as
a nice default (without an explicit -t, a non-persistent qemu-nbd goes
away after a client disconnects, without needing any additional
follow-up commands), and we are not going to change that interface now
(besides, someday we want to point people towards qemu-storage-daemon
instead of qemu-nbd).
But for qemu proper, and the newer qemu-storage-daemon, the QMP
nbd-server-start command has historically had a default of unlimited
number of connections, in part because unlike qemu-nbd it is
inherently persistent until nbd-server-stop. Allowing multiple client
sockets is particularly useful for clients that can take advantage of
MULTI_CONN (creating parallel sockets to increase throughput),
although known clients that do so (such as libnbd's nbdcopy) typically
use only 8 or 16 connections (the benefits of scaling diminish once
more sockets are competing for kernel attention). Picking a number
large enough for typical use cases, but not unlimited, makes it
slightly harder for a malicious client to perform a denial of service
merely by opening lots of connections withot progressing through the
handshake.
This change does not eliminate CVE-2024-7409 on its own, but reduces
the chance for fd exhaustion or unlimited memory usage as an attack
surface. On the other hand, by itself, it makes it more obvious that
with a finite limit, we have the problem of an unauthenticated client
holding 100 fds opened as a way to block out a legitimate client from
being able to connect; thus, later patches will further add timeouts
to reject clients that are not making progress.
This is an INTENTIONAL change in behavior, and will break any client
of nbd-server-start that was not passing an explicit max-connections
parameter, yet expects more than 100 simultaneous connections. We are
not aware of any such client (as stated above, most clients aware of
MULTI_CONN get by just fine on 8 or 16 connections, and probably cope
with later connections failing by relying on the earlier connections;
libvirt has not yet been passing max-connections, but generally
creates NBD servers with the intent for a single client for the sake
of live storage migration; meanwhile, the KubeSAN project anticipates
a large cluster sharing multiple clients [up to 8 per node, and up to
100 nodes in a cluster], but it currently uses qemu-nbd with an
explicit --shared=0 rather than qemu-storage-daemon with
nbd-server-start).
We considered using a deprecation period (declare that omitting
max-parameters is deprecated, and make it mandatory in 3 releases -
then we don't need to pick an arbitrary default); that has zero risk
of breaking any apps that accidentally depended on more than 100
connections, and where such breakage might not be noticed under unit
testing but only under the larger loads of production usage. But it
does not close the denial-of-service hole until far into the future,
and requires all apps to change to add the parameter even if 100 was
good enough. It also has a drawback that any app (like libvirt) that
is accidentally relying on an unlimited default should seriously
consider their own CVE now, at which point they are going to change to
pass explicit max-connections sooner than waiting for 3 qemu releases.
Finally, if our changed default breaks an app, that app can always
pass in an explicit max-parameters with a larger value.
It is also intentional that the HMP interface to nbd-server-start is
not changed to expose max-connections (any client needing to fine-tune
things should be using QMP).
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-12-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[ericb: Expand commit message to summarize Dan's argument for why we
break corner-case back-compat behavior without a deprecation period]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: liuxiangdong <liuxiangdong5@huawei.com>
---
block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c | 3 ++-
blockdev-nbd.c | 8 ++++++++
include/block/nbd.h | 7 +++++++
qapi/block-export.json | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c b/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
index 44f0af3430..bc4bd46b47 100644
--- a/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
+++ b/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
@@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ void hmp_nbd_server_start(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
goto exit;
}
- nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, 0, &local_err);
+ nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS,
+ &local_err);
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
if (local_err != NULL) {
goto exit;
diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index b9e8dc78f3..4bd90bac16 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -171,6 +171,10 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
void nbd_server_start_options(NbdServerOptions *arg, Error **errp)
{
+ if (!arg->has_max_connections) {
+ arg->max_connections = NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+ }
+
nbd_server_start(arg->addr, arg->tls_creds, arg->tls_authz,
arg->max_connections, errp);
}
@@ -183,6 +187,10 @@ void qmp_nbd_server_start(SocketAddressLegacy *addr,
{
SocketAddress *addr_flat = socket_address_flatten(addr);
+ if (!has_max_connections) {
+ max_connections = NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+ }
+
nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, max_connections, errp);
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr_flat);
}
diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
index b71a297249..a31c34a8a6 100644
--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
@@ -33,6 +33,13 @@ extern const BlockExportDriver blk_exp_nbd;
*/
#define NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS 10
+/*
+ * NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS: Number of client sockets to allow at
+ * once; must be large enough to allow a MULTI_CONN-aware client like
+ * nbdcopy to create its typical number of 8-16 sockets.
+ */
+#define NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS 100
+
/* Handshake phase structs - this struct is passed on the wire */
struct NBDOption {
diff --git a/qapi/block-export.json b/qapi/block-export.json
index c1b92ce1c1..181d7238fe 100644
--- a/qapi/block-export.json
+++ b/qapi/block-export.json
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
# recreated on the fly while the NBD server is active.
# If missing, it will default to denying access (since 4.0).
# @max-connections: The maximum number of connections to allow at the same
-# time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 0)
+# time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 100)
#
# Since: 4.2
##
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
# recreated on the fly while the NBD server is active.
# If missing, it will default to denying access (since 4.0).
# @max-connections: The maximum number of connections to allow at the same
-# time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 0)
+# time, 0 for unlimited. (since 5.2; default: 100)
#
# Returns: error if the server is already running.
#
--
2.45.1.windows.1

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From 494093a8482a044290275e01d310100e874cc701 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 12:23:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Close stray clients at
server-stop
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
A malicious client can attempt to connect to an NBD server, and then
intentionally delay progress in the handshake, including if it does
not know the TLS secrets. Although the previous two patches reduce
this behavior by capping the default max-connections parameter and
killing slow clients, they did not eliminate the possibility of a
client waiting to close the socket until after the QMP nbd-server-stop
command is executed, at which point qemu would SEGV when trying to
dereference the NULL nbd_server global which is no longer present.
This amounts to a denial of service attack. Worse, if another NBD
server is started before the malicious client disconnects, I cannot
rule out additional adverse effects when the old client interferes
with the connection count of the new server (although the most likely
is a crash due to an assertion failure when checking
nbd_server->connections > 0).
For environments without this patch, the CVE can be mitigated by
ensuring (such as via a firewall) that only trusted clients can
connect to an NBD server. Note that using frameworks like libvirt
that ensure that TLS is used and that nbd-server-stop is not executed
while any trusted clients are still connected will only help if there
is also no possibility for an untrusted client to open a connection
but then stall on the NBD handshake.
Given the previous patches, it would be possible to guarantee that no
clients remain connected by having nbd-server-stop sleep for longer
than the default handshake deadline before finally freeing the global
nbd_server object, but that could make QMP non-responsive for a long
time. So intead, this patch fixes the problem by tracking all client
sockets opened while the server is running, and forcefully closing any
such sockets remaining without a completed handshake at the time of
nbd-server-stop, then waiting until the coroutines servicing those
sockets notice the state change. nbd-server-stop now has a second
AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED (the first is indirectly through the
blk_exp_close_all_type() that disconnects all clients that completed
handshakes), but forced socket shutdown is enough to progress the
coroutines and quickly tear down all clients before the server is
freed, thus finally fixing the CVE.
This patch relies heavily on the fact that nbd/server.c guarantees
that it only calls nbd_blockdev_client_closed() from the main loop
(see the assertion in nbd_client_put() and the hoops used in
nbd_client_put_nonzero() to achieve that); if we did not have that
guarantee, we would also need a mutex protecting our accesses of the
list of connections to survive re-entrancy from independent iothreads.
Although I did not actually try to test old builds, it looks like this
problem has existed since at least commit 862172f45c (v2.12.0, 2017) -
even back when that patch started using a QIONetListener to handle
listening on multiple sockets, nbd_server_free() was already unaware
that the nbd_blockdev_client_closed callback can be reached later by a
client thread that has not completed handshakes (and therefore the
client's socket never got added to the list closed in
nbd_export_close_all), despite that patch intentionally tearing down
the QIONetListener to prevent new clients.
Reported-by: Alexander Ivanov <alexander.ivanov@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: CVE-2024-7409
CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-14-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
blockdev-nbd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index 4bd90bac16..c71ca38d29 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -21,12 +21,18 @@
#include "io/channel-socket.h"
#include "io/net-listener.h"
+typedef struct NBDConn {
+ QIOChannelSocket *cioc;
+ QLIST_ENTRY(NBDConn) next;
+} NBDConn;
+
typedef struct NBDServerData {
QIONetListener *listener;
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
char *tlsauthz;
uint32_t max_connections;
uint32_t connections;
+ QLIST_HEAD(, NBDConn) conns;
} NBDServerData;
static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
@@ -46,6 +52,14 @@ bool nbd_server_is_running(void)
static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
{
+ NBDConn *conn = nbd_client_owner(client);
+
+ assert(qemu_in_main_thread() && nbd_server);
+
+ object_unref(OBJECT(conn->cioc));
+ QLIST_REMOVE(conn, next);
+ g_free(conn);
+
nbd_client_put(client);
assert(nbd_server->connections > 0);
nbd_server->connections--;
@@ -55,14 +69,20 @@ static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
gpointer opaque)
{
+ NBDConn *conn = g_new0(NBDConn, 1);
+
+ assert(qemu_in_main_thread() && nbd_server);
nbd_server->connections++;
+ object_ref(OBJECT(cioc));
+ conn->cioc = cioc;
+ QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&nbd_server->conns, conn, next);
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
/* TODO - expose handshake timeout as QMP option */
nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
- nbd_blockdev_client_closed, NULL);
+ nbd_blockdev_client_closed, conn);
}
static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
@@ -76,12 +96,25 @@ static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)
{
+ NBDConn *conn, *tmp;
+
if (!server) {
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Forcefully close the listener socket, and any clients that have
+ * not yet disconnected on their own.
+ */
qio_net_listener_disconnect(server->listener);
object_unref(OBJECT(server->listener));
+ QLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(conn, &server->conns, next, tmp) {
+ qio_channel_shutdown(QIO_CHANNEL(conn->cioc), QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH,
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED(NULL, server->connections > 0);
+
if (server->tlscreds) {
object_unref(OBJECT(server->tlscreds));
}
--
2.45.1.windows.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
From 66aa9657f2c64095a18aa90920d53f36f06fea37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 16:05:08 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Drop non-negotiating clients
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
A client that opens a socket but does not negotiate is merely hogging
qemu's resources (an open fd and a small amount of memory); and a
malicious client that can access the port where NBD is listening can
attempt a denial of service attack by intentionally opening and
abandoning lots of unfinished connections. The previous patch put a
default bound on the number of such ongoing connections, but once that
limit is hit, no more clients can connect (including legitimate ones).
The solution is to insist that clients complete handshake within a
reasonable time limit, defaulting to 10 seconds. A client that has
not successfully completed NBD_OPT_GO by then (including the case of
where the client didn't know TLS credentials to even reach the point
of NBD_OPT_GO) is wasting our time and does not deserve to stay
connected. Later patches will allow fine-tuning the limit away from
the default value (including disabling it for doing integration
testing of the handshake process itself).
Note that this patch in isolation actually makes it more likely to see
qemu SEGV after nbd-server-stop, as any client socket still connected
when the server shuts down will now be closed after 10 seconds rather
than at the client's whims. That will be addressed in the next patch.
For a demo of this patch in action:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -r -t -e 10 file &
$ nbdsh --opt-mode -c '
H = list()
for i in range(20):
print(i)
H.insert(i, nbd.NBD())
H[i].set_opt_mode(True)
H[i].connect_uri("nbd://localhost")
'
$ kill $!
where later connections get to start progressing once earlier ones are
forcefully dropped for taking too long, rather than hanging.
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-13-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: rebase to changes earlier in series, reduce scope of timer]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: liuxiangdong <liuxiangdong5@huawei.com>
---
nbd/server.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
nbd/trace-events | 1 +
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index fff9e98bac..026e0b5919 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -2702,22 +2702,48 @@ static void nbd_client_receive_next_request(NBDClient *client)
}
}
+static void nbd_handshake_timer_cb(void *opaque)
+{
+ QIOChannel *ioc = opaque;
+
+ trace_nbd_handshake_timer_cb();
+ qio_channel_shutdown(ioc, QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH, NULL);
+}
+
static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
{
NBDClient *client = opaque;
Error *local_err = NULL;
+ QEMUTimer *handshake_timer = NULL;
qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
- /* TODO - utilize client->handshake_max_secs */
+ /*
+ * Create a timer to bound the time spent in negotiation. If the
+ * timer expires, it is likely nbd_negotiate will fail because the
+ * socket was shutdown.
+ */
+ if (client->handshake_max_secs > 0) {
+ handshake_timer = aio_timer_new(qemu_get_aio_context(),
+ QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME,
+ SCALE_NS,
+ nbd_handshake_timer_cb,
+ client->sioc);
+ timer_mod(handshake_timer,
+ qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME) +
+ client->handshake_max_secs * NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND);
+ }
+
if (nbd_negotiate(client, &local_err)) {
if (local_err) {
error_report_err(local_err);
}
+ timer_free(handshake_timer);
client_close(client, false);
return;
}
+ timer_free(handshake_timer);
nbd_client_receive_next_request(client);
}
diff --git a/nbd/trace-events b/nbd/trace-events
index c4919a2dd5..553546f1f2 100644
--- a/nbd/trace-events
+++ b/nbd/trace-events
@@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ nbd_co_receive_request_decode_type(uint64_t handle, uint16_t type, const char *n
nbd_co_receive_request_payload_received(uint64_t handle, uint32_t len) "Payload received: handle = %" PRIu64 ", len = %" PRIu32
nbd_co_receive_align_compliance(const char *op, uint64_t from, uint32_t len, uint32_t align) "client sent non-compliant unaligned %s request: from=0x%" PRIx64 ", len=0x%" PRIx32 ", align=0x%" PRIx32
nbd_trip(void) "Reading request"
+nbd_handshake_timer_cb(void) "client took too long to negotiate"
--
2.45.1.windows.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
From f529a09058a1a5c9069b9ca506780546b8e7acca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 08:50:01 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] nbd/server: Plumb in new args to nbd_client_add()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Upcoming patches to fix a CVE need to track an opaque pointer passed
in by the owner of a client object, as well as request for a time
limit on how fast negotiation must complete. Prepare for that by
changing the signature of nbd_client_new() and adding an accessor to
get at the opaque pointer, although for now the two servers
(qemu-nbd.c and blockdev-nbd.c) do not change behavior even though
they pass in a new default timeout value.
Suggested-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-11-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: s/LIMIT/MAX_SECS/ as suggested by Dan]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
---
blockdev-nbd.c | 6 ++++--
include/block/nbd.h | 11 ++++++++++-
nbd/server.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
qemu-nbd.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index bdfa7ed3a5..b9e8dc78f3 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
- nbd_client_new(cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
- nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
+ /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as QMP option */
+ nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+ nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
+ nbd_blockdev_client_closed, NULL);
}
static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
index 78d101b774..b71a297249 100644
--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
extern const BlockExportDriver blk_exp_nbd;
+/*
+ * NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS: Number of seconds in which client must
+ * succeed at NBD_OPT_GO before being forcefully dropped as too slow.
+ */
+#define NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS 10
+
/* Handshake phase structs - this struct is passed on the wire */
struct NBDOption {
@@ -338,9 +344,12 @@ AioContext *nbd_export_aio_context(NBDExport *exp);
NBDExport *nbd_export_find(const char *name);
void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+ uint32_t handshake_max_secs,
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
const char *tlsauthz,
- void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool));
+ void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool),
+ void *owner);
+void *nbd_client_owner(NBDClient *client);
void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index 73fd4c46d1..fff9e98bac 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -120,10 +120,12 @@ typedef struct NBDExportMetaContexts {
struct NBDClient {
int refcount;
void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *client, bool negotiated);
+ void *owner;
NBDExport *exp;
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
char *tlsauthz;
+ uint32_t handshake_max_secs;
QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying data channel */
QIOChannel *ioc; /* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */
@@ -2707,6 +2709,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
+ /* TODO - utilize client->handshake_max_secs */
if (nbd_negotiate(client, &local_err)) {
if (local_err) {
error_report_err(local_err);
@@ -2719,14 +2722,17 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
}
/*
- * Create a new client listener using the given channel @sioc.
+ * Create a new client listener using the given channel @sioc and @owner.
* Begin servicing it in a coroutine. When the connection closes, call
- * @close_fn with an indication of whether the client completed negotiation.
+ * @close_fn with an indication of whether the client completed negotiation
+ * within @handshake_max_secs seconds (0 for unbounded).
*/
void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+ uint32_t handshake_max_secs,
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
const char *tlsauthz,
- void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool))
+ void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool),
+ void *owner)
{
NBDClient *client;
Coroutine *co;
@@ -2738,12 +2744,20 @@ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
}
client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
+ client->handshake_max_secs = handshake_max_secs;
client->sioc = sioc;
object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc));
client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
object_ref(OBJECT(client->ioc));
client->close_fn = close_fn;
+ client->owner = owner;
co = qemu_coroutine_create(nbd_co_client_start, client);
qemu_coroutine_enter(co);
}
+
+void *
+nbd_client_owner(NBDClient *client)
+{
+ return client->owner;
+}
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index 86dfa0b5d9..69fd101cd1 100644
--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
nb_fds++;
nbd_update_server_watch();
- nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed);
+ /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as command line option */
+ nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+ tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed, NULL);
}
static void nbd_update_server_watch(void)
--
2.45.1.windows.1

View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Name: qemu
Version: 6.2.0
Release: 96
Release: 97
Epoch: 10
Summary: QEMU is a generic and open source machine emulator and virtualizer
License: GPLv2 and BSD and MIT and CC-BY-SA-4.0
@ -982,6 +982,13 @@ Patch0967: iotests-270-Don-t-store-data-file-with-json-prefix-i.patch
Patch0968: block-introduce-bdrv_open_file_child-helper.patch
Patch0969: block-Parse-filenames-only-when-explicitly-requested.patch
Patch0970: vdpa-Fix-bug-where-vdpa-appliance-migration-does-not.patch
Patch0971: nbd-Minor-style-and-typo-fixes.patch
Patch0972: nbd-server-Plumb-in-new-args-to-nbd_client_add.patch
Patch0973: nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Cap-default-max-connections.patch
Patch0974: nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Drop-non-negotiating-client.patch
Patch0975: aio-wait.h-introduce-AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED.patch
Patch0976: main-loop.h-introduce-qemu_in_main_thread.patch
Patch0977: nbd-server-CVE-2024-7409-Close-stray-clients-at-serv.patch
BuildRequires: flex
BuildRequires: gcc
@ -1580,6 +1587,15 @@ getent passwd qemu >/dev/null || \
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Aug 13 2024 <fengjiabo1@huawei.com> - 10:6.2.0-97
- nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Close stray clients at server-stop
- main-loop.h: introduce qemu_in_main_thread()
- aio-wait.h: introduce AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED
- nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Drop non-negotiating clients
- nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Cap default max-connections to 100
- nbd/server: Plumb in new args to nbd_client_add()
- nbd: Minor style and typo fixes
* Thu Jul 11 2024 <fengjiabo1@huawei.com> - 10:6.2.0-96
- vdpa: Fix bug where vdpa appliance migration does not resume after rollback
- block: Parse filenames only when explicitly requested (CVE-2024-4467)